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EXPANDING DEFENDANT'S DISCOVERY: THE
JENCKS ACT AT PRETRIAL HEARINGS
INTRODUCTION
In federal criminal prosecutions, the Jencks Act1 provides exclu-
sive procedures for defense access to any prior statements or reports
1. 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (1970) provides:
Demands for production of statements and reports of witnesses.
(a) In any criminal prosecution brought by the United States, no state-
ment or report in the possession of the United States which was made by a
Government witness or prospective Government witness (other than the
defendant) shall be the subject of subpoena, discovery, or inspection until
said witness has testified on direct examination in the trial of the case.
(b) After a witness called by the United States has testified on direct
examination, the court shall, on motion of the defendant, order the United
States to produce any statement (as hereinafter defined) of the witness in
the possession of the United States which relates to the subject matter as to
which the witness has testified. If the entire contents of any such statement
relate to the subject matter of the testimony of the witness, the court shall
order it to be delivered directly to the defendant for his examination.
(c) If the United States claims that any statement ordered to be pro-
duced under this section contains matter which does not relate to the sub-
ject matter of the testimony of the witness, the court shall order the 'United
States to deliver such statement for the inspection of the court in camera.
Upon such delivery the court shall excise the portions of such statement which
do not relate to the subject matter of the testimony of the witness. With
such material excised the court shall then direct delivery of such statement
to the defendant for his use. If, pursuant to such procedure, any portion
of such statement is withheld from the defendant and the defendant objects
to such withholding, and the trial is continued to an adjudication of the guilt
of the defendant, the entire text of such statement shall be preserved by the
United States and, in the event the defendant appeals, shall be made avail-
able to the appellate court for the purpose of determining the correctness of
the ruling of the trial judge. Whenever any statement -is delivered to a
defendant pursuant to this section, the court in its discretion, upon applica-
tion of said defendant, may recess proceedings in the trial for such time as
it may determine to be reasonably required for the examination of such
statement by said defendant and his preparation for its use in the trial.
(d) If the United States elects not to comply with an order of the court
under subsection (b) or (c) hereof to deliver to the defendant any such state-
ment or such portion thereof as the court may direct, the court shall strike
from the record the testimony of the witness, and the trial shall proceed
unless the court in its discretion shall determine that the interests of justice
require that a mistrial be declared.
(e) The term "statement," as used in subsections (b), (c), and (d)
of this section in relation to any witness called by the United States, means-
(1) a written statement made by said witness and signed or
otherwise adopted or approved by him;
(2) a stenographic, mechanical, electrical, or other recording, or
a transcription thereof, which is a substantially verbatim recital of an
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of witnesses or potential witnesses for the government.2 This statute
was adopted in response to fears aroused by the decision of the Su-
preme Court in Jencks v. United States.8 In Jencks, the court held
that, in the case of witnesses who had testified at trial, the defendant
was entitled to inspect all reports of the witnesses which referred to
events about which they had testified. The defendant was not required
to show any inconsistency with the testimony, and the reports were
to be produced without regard to their admissibility into evidence.
Mr. Justice Clark, dissenting in Jencks, expressed the fear that the
majority approach would afford defendants a "Roman holiday for
rummaging through confidential information" in the possession of the
government. 4
It was apparently this language which sparked intense public re-
action against the Jencks decision., In response to public pressure and
to modify lower court decisions which were perceived to interpret
Jencks too broadly the Jencks Act was passed. 6 The statute was de-
signed to prevent excessive and untimely production of statements7
and to restrict the use of such statements to purposes of impeach-
ment.8 It is the purpose of this Comment to examine the operation
of the Jencks Act in the context of pretrial hearings in order to ascer-
tain whether the Act fulfills its purpose to "further the fair and just
administration of criminal justice"0 in that context. Additionally, an
alternative to present procedures will be proposed which might better
fulfill that purpose.
I. GOVERNMENT INTERESTS RELATING TO DIsCLOSUIRE OF STATEMENTS
The passage of the Jencks Act represented a congressional deci-
sion to enter into the field of criminal discovery, an area which tradi-
oral statement made by said witness and recorded contemporaneously
with the making of such oral statement; or
(3) a statement, however taken or recorded, or a transcription
thereof, if any, made by said witness to a grand jury.
2. See Palermo v. United States, 360 U.S. 343 (1959).
3. 353 U.S. 657 (1959).
4. Id. at 681-82.
5. For a discussion of the public reaction to the Jenaks decision, see Note, The
Jeneks Legislation, 67 YALE L.J. 674 (1958).
6. Id. at 676.
7. The term "statement" as used hereafter is defined as in 18 U.S.C. § 3500(e)
(1970).
8. Palermo v. United States, 360 U.S. 343 (1959).
9. Campbell v. United States, 365 U.S. 85, 92 (1961).
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tionally has been the province of the judiciary.10 It was feared that
extensive discovery of government files under the guise of obtaining
statements would hamper effective law enforcement and could poten-
tially endanger national security.1 While it has been argued that these
concerns were out of proportion to the actual scope of Jencks, and
that the Act is unnecessarily restrictive in its approach to the prob-
lem,12 the fact remains that the intent of Congress was to protect
legitimate governmental interests in restricting access to government
files in the face of a perceived threat to those interests. It is therefore
necessary to identify any interests the government may have in re-
stricting or delaying defense access to statements made by government
witnesses.
In some cases, the statement may contain information relevant
to national security. The government's interest in restricting access to
such material is obvious. The material may be so important that the
prosecution will elect to resist disclosure altogether, thereby creating
the possibility of losing the case through having the testimony of the
witness excluded or a mistrial declared. 3 However, it may be assumed
that cases in which national security interests are at stake will be rela-
tively rare in proportion to the total number of federal criminal prose-
cutions. In the majority of cases, a different justification must be
found.
In cases where national security is not. a factor, the interests of
the government are basically the same as those which traditionally
have been advanced in opposition to liberal discovery by defendants
in criminal cases.' 4 The identity of witnesses must be concealed to
prevent any improper interference by unscrupulous defendants and
defense counsel.'5 Secondly, the government has an interest in con-
cealing the nature of its case to prevent the defendant from fabricat-
ing defenses to fit the evidence which the government possesses and
10. Note, supra note 5, at 674.
11. See S. REP. No. 981, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. and H.R. RElP. No. 700, 85th
Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 2 U.S.C. CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 1861-64 (1957).
12. Note, The Jencks Act, 73 H~av. L. REv. 179 (1959); Note, supra note 5.
13. 18 U.S.C. § 3500(d) (1970).
14. See, e.g., State v. Tune, 13 N.J. 203, 98 A.2d 881 (1953) (Vanderbilt,
C.J., for the majority); Brennan, The Criminal Prosecution, 1963 WASH. U.L.Q. 279;
Everett, Discovery in Criminal Cases, 1964 DuKF L.J. 477; Goldstein, The State and
the Accused, 69 YAIE L.J. 1149 (1960).
15. Such interference could include subornation to perjury, bribery, and intimida-
tion, as well as direct threats to the safety of the witness or other persons.
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from improperly altering evidence. Finally, the government has an
interest in protecting its investigative files to prevent information
therein from falling into the hands of those who have not been for-
mally charged or who may be charged at a later date. Thus, in addi-
tion to the interest in concealing the identity of witnesses before they
testify, there is an interest in concealing the substance of their testi-
mony until the testimony is presented in open court.16 It is primarily
for these and similar reasons that production of statements is restricted
by the Jencks Act.
Proponents of more liberalized criminal discovery argue that these
interests are not sufficiently strong in every criminal case to justify
restriction of access to relevant materials by blanket prohibitive
rules.17 The prosecution may have interests which would support early
disclosure rather than delay. The prosecution has a duty to prevent
wrongful convictions which is as strong as the duty to secure proper
ones.18 To the extent that discovery operates as a device to ascertain
the truth, this interest will be promoted by liberalized discovery. On
the other hand, discovery could reveal the hopelessness of the de-
fense's case, which would tend to induce the defendant to enter plea
bargaining negotiations at an early stage of the proceedings. 10 Such a
result would be in the prosecution's interest, and would tend to reduce
the burden on the entire criminal justice system. Liberal discovery
also would aid the government in protecting against postconviction
charges of prejudicial surprise and failure to produce material and
exculpatory evidence.20 Finally, in regard to statements which would
ultimately be available at trial, early disclosure may prevent delay at
trial,2 ' where the inconvenience is greatest for all parties.
The government has a variety of interests relating to disclosure of
statements, and these interests will in some cases be in conflict. The
need for suppression may be strongest where organized crime or vio-
16. The nature and scope of all these interests is more fully developed in the
literature cited in note 14 supra.
17. See, e.g., Jones v. Superior Court, 58 Cal. 2d 56, 372 P.2d 919, 22 Cal.
Rptr. 879 (1962) (Peters, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); materials
cited in note 14 supra.
18. See Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78 (1935).
19. See Brennan, supra note 14.
20. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
21. See 18 U.S.C. § 3500(c) (1970), which allows for continuance at trial to
allow the defense adequate time to inspect any statement produced.
PRETRIAL HEARINGS
lence-prone defendants are involved,22 and suppression of statements
may be fully justified in such cases. In other cases, the governmental
interests might better be fulfilled by disclosure. It follows, then, that
blanket rules against discovery are unnecessary to protect govern-
mental interests.. Such rules are particularly ill-advised when they in-
terfere with the legitimate interest of defendants in obtaining pretrial
discovery. In spite of this fact, the Jencks Act has had the effect of
totally excluding the defendant from access to statements of govern-
ment witnesses who testify at pretrial hearings. It is appropriate at
this point to examine the nature and scope of this rule.
II. TnE OPERATION OF, THE JENCKS ACT AT PRETRLAL HEARINGS
The term "pretrial hearing" is used for the purposes of this Com-
ment to mean any formal proceedings where the accused and the
prosecution confront each other before an official in a judicial capacity
at any time subsequent to the inception of the criminal proceedings,
but before trial on the merits.23 The term thus embraces the pre-
liminary hearing, hearings to suppress evidence such as the Wade
hearing,2 and other hearings which may be held to rule on defense
or prosecution motions. The term does not include grand jury pro-
ceedings, interrogation of witnesses by either side, in camera inspec-
tions of evidence, 25 or other events which are not public or adver-
sarial.
The Jencks Act, by its terms, appears to be an absolute bar to
the compulsory26 production of witness' prior statements at any pre-
trial hearings. The first paragraph of the Act provides that such state-
ments are not subject to inspection until the witness "has testified on
direct examination in the trial of the case."' 27 Generally, the type of
22. For the proposition that advocates on each side of the discovery issue are
arguing about different factual situations, see J. MooRE, FEDERAL PRACrICE Y 16.02
(1965). The basic idea is that opponents of liberal discovery are concerned with
organized crime, while proponents are thinking of the indigent defendant. The im-
plication is that the justification for suppression may be stronger in situations in-
volving organized crime.
23. Cf. Menard v. Bowman Dairy Go., 296 I1. App. 323, 15 N.E.2d 1014 (1938)
(civil case).
24. See United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
25. See FED. R. CuAr. P. 16(e).
26. Nothing in the Jencks Act prohibits voluntary disclosure by the prosecution.
27. 18 U.S.C. § 3500(a) (1970) (emphasis added).
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proceeding which will fall into the definition of "pretrial hearing"
will not be considered part of the "trial of the case." This construc-
tion follows not only from the designation of the proceedings as "pre-
trial," but also from other provisions relating to the conduct of crimi-
nal proceedings. For example, the Federal Rules of Criminal Proce-
dure provide that: "Defenses and objections based on defects in the
institution of the prosecution or in the indictment or information
other than that it fails to show jurisdiction in the court or to charge
an offense may be raised only by motion before trial."28 Similarly, the
prohibition of double jeopardy found in the Constitution2 has been
construed to cover only those situations where jeopardy attaches
through the empaneling of a jury,80 and retrial has been permitted
even after this event in some circumstances.81
This construction of the statutory language finds support in the
case law. The Jencks Act has been held to prohibit compulsory pro-
duction of statements at pretrial hearings, 2 after guilt has been ascer-
tained 3 at parole revocation hearings,8 4 and even at draft classifica-
tion proceedings.3 5 While not all of the cited cases have dealt ex-
pressly with the language of the first paragraph, the results are entirely
consistent with the strict construction normally afforded the term
"trial" in criminal prosecutions. In the Second Circuit, the United
States Court of Appeals has dealt directly with the "trial" terminology
in applying the Act to pretrial hearings to suppress illegally seized
evidence. In United States v. Covello," the court went beyond the
face of the statute to inquire into congressional intent. Despite the
seemingly clear statutory language, the court found that:
28. FED. R. Cium. P. 12(b) (2) (emphasis added).
29. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
30. See Downum v. United States, 372 U.S. 734 (1965).
31. E.g., Gori v. United States, 367 U.S. 364 (1961); United States v. Perez,
22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 579 (1824).
32. E.g., United States v. Sebastian, 497 F.2d 1267 (2d Cir 1974) (suppression
hearing); Robbins v. United States, 476 F.2d 26 (10th Cir. 1973) (preliminary hear-
ing); United States v. Montos, 421 F.2d 215 (5th Cir. 1970) (suppression hearing),
cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1022 (1970).
33. E.g., United States v. White, 342 F.2d 379 (4th Cir. 1965) (motion to
vacate sentence); United States v. Greathouse, 188 F. Supp. 765 (M.D. Ala. 1960)
(defendant not entitled to production of presentencing report after entering plea of
guilty).
34. United States v. Hodges, 489 F.2d 212 (5th Cir. 1973).
35. United States v. Neverline, 266 F.2d 180 (3d Cir. 1959).
36. 410 F.2d 536 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 879 (1969).
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Suppression hearings are nowhere alluded to in the legislative
history and the statute does not supply any direct guidance for con-
duct at such hearings. In all probability Congress did not consider the
question whether a suppression hearing is itself a "trial" or whether
such a hearing is so much an integral part of the criminal trial that
determines a defendant's innocence or guilt so as to intend either that
the Act apply to such a hearing or that it not do so. 3 7
However, from this conclusion that the statute did not provide direct
guidance for the conduct of suppression hearings, the court went on
to conclude that the production of statements at such hearings could
not be compelled by the defendant as a matter of right. This result
was based upon the normal strict construction of the term "trial" in
criminal proceedings. The Covello decision seemed to leave open the
question of whether the district court judge could exercise discretion
in ordering the production of statements. This was due in large part
to Covello's characterization of the case of United States v. Foley3s as
"holding no more than that we left it to the discretion of the trial
judge whether to order a production of documents.. . ."39 When this
language was read in connection with the finding that the Jencks Act
did not supply direct guidance for suppression hearings, it appeared
that district court judges would be allowed to compel disclosure in
some cases.
The defendant in United States v. Sebastian0 relied upon these
cases in an attempt to have the Second Circuit uphold a lower court
order suppressing certain evidence because of the refusal of the gov-
ernment to turn over Jencks material at the suppression hearing. The
Court of Appeals reversed the order after stating that it might prefer,
as a matter of policy, to uphold.41 The opinion stated that the court
did "not feel that [it could] ignore the weight of authority, including
[its] own, or the language of the Act in the absence of contrary legis-
lative history or specific direction from Congress."4 2 The "authority"
of which the court spoke consisted in part of cases relating to dis-
covery motions.43 Only two cases were cited relating directly to sup-
37. Id. at 543-44.
38. 283 F.2d 582 (2d Cir. 1960).
39. 410 F.2d at 544-45.
40. 497 F.2d 1267 (2d Cir. 1974).
41. Id. at 1270.
42. Id.
43. United States v. Percevault, 490 F.2d 126 (2d Cir. 1974), United States
v. McMillen, 489 F.2d 229 (7th dir. 1972), and United States v. Lyles, 471 F.2d
1167 (5th Cir. 1972), were the discovery cases relied upon in Sebastian.
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pression hearings, Covello and United States v. Montos.44 In Montos,
production of Jencks Act materials was denied without any discussion
of the intent of Congress to apply the Act to suppression hearings;
the decision rested on the statutory language alone.
The production of statements at preliminary hearings was at issue
in Robbins v. United States.45 The court found that the statutory
language was clear, and denied compulsory disclosure on the grounds
that the hearing was not a "trial" within the meaning of that language.
The further argument was made that the committing magistrate is not
a "court" and therefore was not allowed to order production of state-
ments within the provisions of the Act. Substantially the same reason-
ing was applied by the court in Gibson v. Halleck,40 with the same
result.
It is apparent, both from the statutory language and the case law,
that the Jencks Act creates a complete bar to the production of state-
ments at pretrial hearings -whenever the government resists produc-
tion. This result occurs regardless of the legitimacy of prosecutorial
reasons for resisting disclosure for the government is not required to
reveal its reasons.47 The Act thus creates the very type of blanket rule
which legitimate governmental interests do not require. It remains
to be seen whether this rule substantially interferes with interests of
the defendant. Such interests at pretrial hearings can best be seen by
examining the nature of such hearings, with particular emphasis on
the need of the defendant to impeach witnesses who testify at them.4 8
III. THE NATURE OF PRETRIAL HEARINGS
A. General Considerations
In addition to the fact that governmental interests in criminal
prosecutions do not require blanket rules against discovery of state-
44. 421 F.2d 215 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1022 (1970).
45. 476 F.2d 26 (10th Cir. 1973).
46. 254 F. Supp. 159 (D.D.C. 1966).
47. By way of example, in Sebastian the government relied merely upon the
Jencks Act and related case law. No showing was made that disclosure in that case
would interfere with any legitimate government interests. Under the terms of the Act
no such showing is required.
48. The clear intent of Congress to restrict use of statements to purposes of
impeachment would apply even if production could be compelled at pretrial hearings.
For an analysis of the congressional intent behind the Act, see Palermo v. United
States, 360 U.S. 343, 352 (1959).
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ments, the defendant has a variety of legitimate interests in obtaining
statements of witnesses who testify at pretrial hearings. By prohibiting
disclosure, the Act interferes with these interests. It is difficult to
generalize about "pretrial hearings" because their scope is as broad
as the potential motions in a criminal case are numerous. The search
for connecting threads is prompted by the distinction embodied in
the Jencks Act between such hearings and a trial. This distinction can
be justified only if there are no interests of the defendant which
require disclosure prior to trial. In other words, if the defendant has
no need to impeach government witnesses at pretrial hearings, the
present rule may be sufficient. Otherwise, the rule could be justified
by showing that production at trial would fully protect the interests
of the defendant in impeaching government witnesses. This latter
position would have greater appeal if it could be shown that produc-
tion at trial would have further benefits, such as speeding up the
criminal justice process and thereby relieving court congestion. It is
submitted that none of these potential justifications will withstand
scrutiny. In order to examine this proposition more fully, it will be
helpful to look at some examples of pretrial hearings. For these pur-
poses, an examination of the preliminary hearing and the hearing on
a motion to suppress illegally obtained evidence hopefully will suffice
to reveal the problems with such justifications of the Jencks Act provi-
sions.
B. The Suppression Hearing
The first hearing to be scrutinized is the hearing on a motion to
suppress illegally obtained evidence, for "the case for pre-trial dis-
closure is strongest in the framework of a suppression hearing." 49
Whether one perceives the interest in excluding illegally obtained
evidence from criminal prosecutions as protecting the rights of the
defendant or simply as an application of the doctrine of judicial in-
tegrity,50 there can be little doubt that, in practice, the stakes for the
defendant in the outcome of the hearing are of great significance. This
is particularly true in the case where the only meaningful defense
available to the offense charged is that the evidence which the govern-
49. United States v. Sebastian, 497 F.2d 1267, 1270 (2d Cir. 1974).
50. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), dealt with both of these factors as
basic justifications for the ruling that the exclusionary rule is required by the Con-
stitution in state as well as federal prosecutions.
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ment seeks to introduce was illegally obtained. Despite the importance
to the defendant of the outcome of such a hearing, the Jencks Act
operates to deny him the opportunity to examine prior statements of
any witness who may testify at the hearing.
It is difficult to perceive how release of information which falls
within the provisions of the Jencks Act 5' in such a setting would have
adverse consequences for effective law enforcement. There would be
little need to worry about the disclosure of the identity of the witness
for he will be present before the court at the time the motion to
produce is made. To the extent that any prior statement might con-
tain references to other witnesses whose identity the prosecution may
wish to conceal, the statement could be submitted to the court for in
camera inspection and the information could be removed.5 2 Since any
statement to be obtained by the defense must relate "to the subject
matter as to which the witness has testified,"53 there is likewise little
to fear in regard to untimely disclosure of the substance of the witness'
testimony. Again, the statement may be submitted to the court for in
camera inspection. The in camera inspection would allow the court
to remove any information about which the witness would not testify
until trial, as well as information of an investigatory nature about
persons not involved in the proceedings. In sum, the provisions which
operate to restrict the use of statements to purposes of impeachment
when the statements are released at trial would operate in the same
fashion at a suppression hearing. The discovery value of the state-
ment would be no greater than that afforded by the testimony of the
witness except for the discovery of matters relevant to the impeach-
ment of the witness.
On the other hand, if the defendant is not allowed to have access
to the statements, he is effectively denied the opportunity to fully
impeach and cross-examine the witness. It is no answer to this problem
to say that the statements will be available after the witness testifies
at trial. In most instances the issues of the suppression hearing will
51. It is beyond the scope of this Comment to examine the merit of the pro-
visions of the Jencks Act except insofar as they affect compulsory disclosure of state-
ments at pretrial hearings. It is assumed that the scope of materials which may be
ordered produced and the procedural requirements of the Act would remain un-
changed if statements were to be available at pretrial hearings.
52. See 18 U.S.C. § 3500(c) (1970).
53. Id. § 3500(b).
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not be relitigated at trial.54 Even in the instance where relitigation is
permitted, both the defense and the prosecution will have been put
to the expense and inconvenience of preparing for trial when a fuller
impeachment of the witness at the hearing might have revealed the
problem with the evidence.
A closely related problem arises when the witness does not testify
at the trial.", Because relitigation of suppression issues is infrequent,
the witness at the suppression hearing may not testify at trial unless
he has further testimony which bears upon the issues at trial. The
problem is complicated even more by the fact that portions tf the
statement which relate only to the issues at the hearing might be
excised when and if the statement is produced at trial. In either event,
the defendant is deprived of the opportunity to fully impeach the
witness' testimony relating to the issues of the hearing.
Finally, in many cases trial may never be held.56 There is little
doubt that in many cases the outcome of the hearing will determine
the outcome of the entire proceedings. The defendant might be in-
duced to enter a plea after it is determined that the evidence which
is offered against him is admissible.57 In such situations, the govern-
ment will have secured a conviction on the basis of testimony which
the defendant is unable to fully challenge because he has been denied
access to materials relevant, or potentially relevant, to the impeach-
ment of the witness.58
54. See United States v. Koenig, 290 F.2d 166, 172 (5th Cir. 1961), aff'd sub.
nom. Dibella v. United States, 369 U.S. 121 (1962); cf. Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S.
368 (1964).
55. This was a concern of the trial court in Sebastian. 497 F.2d at 1270; see
Record of Hearing on Motion to Suppress Evidence at 34.
56. In 1971, 26.9 percent of all defendants convicted in federal district courts
changed an initial plea of not guilty to one of guilty or nolo contendere. ADiNismTRA-
TIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES CouRTs, FEDERAL OFFENDERS IN THE UNITED
STATES DISTRICT COURTS 6, 42 (1971).
57. FED. R. CRus. P. 12(b) (5) provides in part: "If a motion is determined
adversely to the defendant he shall be permitted to plead if he had not previously
pleaded."
58. "Absent some governmental requirement that information be kept confidential
for the purposes of effective law enforcement, [the government] has no interest . . .
in convicting on the testimony of witnesses who have not been as rigorously cross-
examined and as thoroughly impeached as the evidence permits." Jones v. Superior
Court, 58 Cal. 2d 56, 59, 372 P.2d 919, 920, 22 Cal. Rptr. 879, 880 (1962)
(citation omitted in original).
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C. The Preliminary Hearing
Any person accused of committing a crime is entitled to an early
determination of the issue of whether or not there is probable cause
to bind the person over for trial. While it has been held that there is
no right to have this determination made at a preliminary hearing,50
when such a hearing is held the defendant should be entitled to fully
examine government witnesses who appear. The need for effective
cross-examination of government witnesses was one of the factors
which lead the Supreme Court to conclude that the accused is entitled
to the presence of counsel at such hearings.10 While there are those
who might argue that the credibility of government witnesses should
not be a consideration at the hearing,0 1 recent court decisions serve to
point out the interests of the accused in impeachment of witnesses at
the time of the hearing. Perhaps the most significant such case is
California v. Green62 in which it was held that testimony of a witness
at a preliminary hearing could be admitted at trial when the same
witness was evasive and uncooperative at the trial. For many years,
such testimony has been admissible where the witness was unavailable
at trial. 3 In deciding Green, the Court placed great emphasis on the
fact that the witness in that case had been cross-examined at the
preliminary hearing. While Green dealt with a state prosecution and
therefore did not involve any Jencks Act questions, there is little
reason to suppose that in a federal prosecution the courts would find
that failure to turn over statements of the witness at the preliminary
hearing would require a result different than that reached in Green.
Precedents do not reveal any constitutional requirements that
effective cross-examination requires the production of Jencks materials.
The Supreme Court decision in Jencks was not based on constitu-
tional grounds, but rather was an exercise of that Court's supervisory
power in the absence of congressional action.'0 In United States v.
Moceri65 the district court indicated by way of dictum that complete
59. Sciortino v. Zampano, 385 F.2d 132 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S.
906 (1968).
60. Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1 (1970).
61. See, e.g., 106 U. PA. L. REv. 589 (1958).
62. 399 U.S. 149 (1970).
63. See Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237 (1895).
64. See Palermo v. United States, 360 U.S. 343 (1959).
65. 359 F. Supp. 431 (N.D. Ohio 1973).
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deprivation of access to statements or a showing of prejudice might
raise issues of constitutional dimensions. The courts may well be re-
luctant to rule that good faith compliance with the terms of the Jencks
Act by the magistrate and the prosecution in the context of the pre-
liminary hearing would render the testimony of the witness at the
hearing inadmissible at trial where counsel had otherwise been granted
an opportunity to cross-examine the witness.
Production of statements at trial will not protect the interests of
the defendant. In terms of the defendant's interest in a full hearing
on the probable cause issue to prevent unjustified and burdensome
prosecutions,66 simple logic dictates that occurrences at trial cannot
protect the defendant. If the testimony from the preliminary hearing
is later admitted at trial because the witness becomes unavailable, ef-
fective impeachment will be impossible. If a Green analysis were
applied to federal prosecutions, the very same uncooperativeness which
would justify admission of the testimony will prevent effective cross-
examination.
The degree of discovery permitted by disclosure at the prelim-
inary hearing will be limited by those provisions of the Jencks Act
which serve to limit the use of statements to purposes of impeachment.
The witness' identity will be revealed by his presence at the hearing.
The provision which requires the statement to relate only to matters
as to which the witness has testified will prevent discovery beyond that
afforded by the hearing itself. While the witness will perhaps appear
at trial more frequently than in the case of suppression hearings
because of the greater relation of the hearing to issues of guilt and
innocence, nonappearance at trial is still a possibility. This is par-
ticularly true if hearsay testimony is admissible at the preliminary
hearing.67 The witness' testimony at trial may differ from that at the
hearing, raising the possibility that statements which relate only to the
testimony at the hearing will not be producible at trial. The interests
of the defendant will be served by production, while in the majority
of cases no governmental interests will require suppression.
It is generally recognized that the discovery value of the prelim-
inary hearing for the defendant is merely incidental, and does not of
66. See Thies v. State, 178 Wis. 98, 103, 189 N.W. 539, 541 (1922).
67. See Washington v. Clemmer, 339 F.2d 725, 728 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
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itself serve as a justification for holding the hearing.08 This does not
mean that when such a hearing is held the defense should be denied
access to statements of witnesses who appear, for the discovery which
the defendant seeks is not the sort which goes to the nature of the
government's case against the accused. Rather, it is sought for (and
will only be useful for) purposes of impeachment. In a sense, pro-
viding the statements at the preliminary hearing will serve as a partial
substitute for the protection inherent in the nature of the grand
jury.69 A full and complete hearing on all the evidence offered against
the defendant will tend to provide "security to the innocent against
hasty, malicious and oppressive persecution" 70 when the accused is
charged without an indictment.
D. Some Conclusions About Pretrial Hearings
This examination of the suppression hearing and the preliminary
hearing obviously does not encompass the full range of proceedings
which could fall within the definition of "pretrial hearings." However,
other hearings would be subject to the same type of analysis since they
presumably deal with issues of substantial importance to the defendant.
The issue of disclosure will be of less importance at some hearings. If
the hearing deals only with questions of law and not of fact, the
government may not offer any witnesses, and the issue will not arise
at all. In any proceeding where witnesses are offered, ,considerations
analogous to those offered in regard to suppression or preliminary
hearings will apply. The narrow scope of the information which could
be ordered to be produced at any hearing under the Jencks Act would
be sufficient to protect legitimate government interests in the majority
of cases, while the interests of the accused will be better served by
allowing compulsory disclosure of statements. Because the current
provisions of the Jencks Act tend to prevent this result, the Act fails
to fulfill its purpose to promote the fair and just administration of
criminal justice.71 The problem becomes one of searching for possible
avenues of relief from the current rules governing production of state-
ments at pretrial hearings.
68. Sciortino v. Zampano, 385 F.2d 132 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S.
906 (1968).
69. Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375, 390 (1962).
70. Id.
71. See Campbell v. United States, 365 U.S. 85 (1961).
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., • IV. PROSPECTS FOR JuDicAL REFORm
The issue of production of statements at pretrial hearings has not
been fully litigated on the appellate level.72 Despite this fact, it is
submitted that the judiciary will provide a poor vehicle for the insti-
tution of reform in this area, primarily because Congress has chosen
to act in the area thereby limiting the power of the courts to act. The
lack. of appellate level litigation may be more indicative of the prob-
lems with judicial reform than that of the potential for judicial activ-
ism. The statutory language and existing case law could arguably be
exerting a chilling effect on the willingness of counsel to extensively
litigate the issue,73 particularly where funding is a problem. However,
the willingness of counsel to expend time and money to litigate is not
the sole barrier to judicial reform.
In any attempt to seek relief from present standards, it will be
necessary first to convince the court that the Jencks Act does not ab-
solutely prohibit disclosure. 74 This could be accomplished, following
the Second Circuit's approach in Covello, through reliance on the lack
of evidence of congressional intent to apply the Act to pretrial hear-
ings. If this obstacle can be cleared, defense counsel would be free to
raise the policy arguments relating to the balance of interests between
the defendant and the government.75 Even if courts other than the
Second Circuit show a willingness to examine these issues, the po-
tential for success is limited, for the courts have shown a strong dis-
inclination to order pretrial production of statements. To illustrate
this fact, a number of cases relating to pretrial discovery motions will
be reviewed. Such cases are more numerous than those dealing with
pretrial hearings, and will serve to cast further light on prevailing
judicial attitudes toward modification of the Jencks Act through judi-
cial interpretation. 76
72. A survey of the cases indicates that most circuits have not dealt with the
problem at all. No Supreme Court decisions have directly considered the issue.
73. The same statutory language and case law which has led courts to con-
clude that the Act prohibits compulsory disclosure at pretrial hearings may convince
counsel of the futility of such litigation. See text accompanying note 24-48 supra.
74. "Statements of a government witness . . . which cannot be produced under
the terms of 18 U.S.C. § 3500 cannot be produced at all." Palermo v. United States,
360 U.S. 343, 351 (1959).
75. Such arguments will necessarily vary with the nature of the particular hear-
ing and the facts of the case, but would probably be analogous to the arguments with
which this Comment has dealt at length.
76. It should be remembered that congressional intent to limit the use of state-
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The Supreme Court set the tone for judicial review of the Act the
first time it was called upon to decide a case arising thereunder:
In almost every enactment there are gaps to be filled and ambiguities
to be resolved by judicial construction. This statute is not free from
them. Here, however, the detailed particularity with which Congress
has spoken has narrowed the scope for needful interpretation to an
unusual degree. The statute clearly defines procedures and plainly
indicates the circumstances for their application.77
The lower federal courts have consistently followed this theme by
routinely denying discovery motions aimed at statements of potential
government witnesses. Usually, little or no regard is paid to any policy
considerations.78 Of potentially greater significance is the fact that
there has been strong resistance to permitting discovery even where
the court has been willing to entertain policy considerations which
argue for disclosure. As an example, in United States v. Wilkerson,"
the court refused to rule that the defendant could compel disclosure
of his own confession where the confession was made to a witness who
subsequently reported it to government agents. The defendant sought
discovery of an F.B.I. agent's report which embodied the substance of
an interview with the witness. The court reviewed several policy fac-
tors relating to the desirability of allowing discovery of a defendant's
own confession, but concluded that these factors were not as per-
suasive where the confession was made to a person other than a gov-
ernment agent. It held that the Jencks Act prohibited pretrial disclo-
sure. The result of this decision was to deny defense access to
materials, which are normally discoverable under different circum-
stances,80 on the grounds that the material sought fell within the pro-
visions of the Jencks Act.
In United States v. Harris,81 the court rejected arguments based
on the doctrine of Brady v. Maryland,s2 which requires the prosecu-
ments to purposes of impeachment ill render the case for production during discovery
less compelling than for production at pretrial hearings.
77. Palermo v. United States, 360 U.S. 343, 349 (1959) (emphasis added).
78. See, e.g., Carpenter v. United States, 463 F.2d 397 (10th Cir. 1972) ; United
States v. Kenny, 462 F.2d 1205 (3d Cir. 1972); United States v. Cole, 453 F.2d 902(8th Cir. 1972); Benefield v. United States, 370 F.2d 912 (5th Cir. 1966).
79. 456 F.2d 57 (6th Cir. 1972).
80. See FED. R. Caim. P. 16(a).
81. 458 F.2d 670 (5th Cir. 1972).
82. 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
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tion to turn over to the defense any material or exculpatory evidence
in its possession. The Harris court concluded that the Brady doctrine
could not automatically override the Jencks Act absent a showing of
prejudice. The court did not address the problem of how such a show-
ing could be made when the statement is unavailable to the defense.
This problem was a major factor in the original Jencks decision. The
potential conflict between the Brady doctrine and the Jencks Act was
resolved in favor of the statute in United States v. Trainor8 as well.
Judicial reluctance to contradict the terms of the Jencks Act is
best illustrated by cases where the court expressly states that it would
prefer to order production because of policy factors, but rules that the
Act prohibits such a result. In one such case, the court held that the
lower court had properly denied the defendant's motion for discovery,
but went on to say that: "[w]here the identity of the government's
witnesses and the probable nature of their testimony is known, speedy
resolution of Jencks Act problems by early and full disclosure may
serve the interests of all concerned."8 4 In United States v. Percevault,8 5
the court ruled that the Jencks Act prohibited compulsory disclosure
prior to trial, but suggested that the pretrial conference was an ap-
propriate forum for working out Jencks Act problems through volun-
tary cooperation. The court in United States v. Moceris6 strongly criti-
cised the Jencks Act.
While sustaining the validity of the Jencks Act on its face, some com-
ment upon the wisdom of the Act does not seem inappropriate ....
[D]isclosure, and not secrecy, is more likely to promote swift and ef-
fective justice. The public interest in speedy criminal trials... is evi-
dent .... The Jencks Act would appear to be contrary to the current
objectives of many members of Congress. Hopefully that body will
exercise its powers to re-examine the wisdom of the statute.8 7
The result in all of these cases in consistent with the language of
the statute.88 They are used here to indicate the degree of judicial
83. 423 F.2d 263 (1st Cir. 1970).
84. Ogden v. United States, 303 F.2d 724, 734 (9th Cir. 1962).
85. 490 F.2d 126 (2d Cir. 1974).
86. 359 F. Supp. 431 (N.D. Ohio 1973).
87. Id. at 439.
88. The clarity of the Act's language may have narrowed the scope for judicial
review, but the uniformity of reported decisions has virtually eliminated all interpreta-
tion. The result of rigidity in judicial attitudes is a lack of meaningful precedent for
those seeking to have the Act interpreted in a more liberal fashion.
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reluctance to contradict the terms of the Act which those who attempt
to assert policy arguments are likely to encounter. The statute refers
directly to discovery, 9 rather than pretrial hearings, but the approach
of the Second Circuit in Covello and Sebastian indicates that this dif-
ference will have small effect upon judicial attitudes. 0
It is because of these attitudes that the best chance for meaning-
ful reform of the Jencks Act lies with congressional action and not
with the courts. The language of Moceri and Sebastian indicates that
this is the belief of the federal judiciary as well. Unlike the case-by-
case approach which the courts may pursue in formulating new rules,
Congress must search for a standard which has wider application. It
is necessary to examine certain potential standards in order to find
a rule which would effectively protect all interests involved.
V. A PROPOSAL FOR CONGRESSIONAL REFORM
A blanket rule such as that provided by the Jencks Act for pro-
duction at trial after the witness has testified seems as unwise as the
current rule which prohibits production in all cases. A rule making
production mandatory upon the conclusion of the witness' testimony
on direct examination at the pretrial hearing would be based on the
assumption that the government could never have a legitimate inter-
est in suppression of the witness' statement. While it has been demon-
strated that in many cases there is no governmental interest sufficient
to justify interference with the defendant's need to fully impeach,
it does not follow that there could be no such cases. It appears that
some situations would require the defendant's interest to give way to
the larger interests of the government in preserving effective law en-
forcement or national security.91
A rule leaving the question to the discretion of the presiding judi-
cial officer also seems unwise. Such an approach would be time-con-
suming, as the official would be required to examine the issues at every
hearing which might be held in the course of a criminal prosecution.
89. 18 U.S.C. § 3500(a) (1970).
90. See text accompanying notes 40-42 supra.
91. Requiring the government to choose at the pretrial stage in every case be-
tween the production of the statement or the loss of the testimony of the witness
who made it seems unnecessarily harsh if an alternative can be found. The rule pro-
posed in this Comment will hopefully provide an alternative which will still protect
the interests of the defendant. See note 93 infra & accompanying text.
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In the majority of cases, there would be little need for such delay as
the real issues would be insubstantial. In light of congested court cal-
endars and the need to expedite the criminal justice process, such delay
cannot be tolerated unless there is no alternative which would fully
protect the potentially competing interests.
A second consideration argues against a rule which would rely
exclusively upon the discretion of the presiding official. It has been
asserted that such rules governing criminal discovery are merely a
means of avoiding issues, and that such rules usually lead to restricted
discovery rather than liberalism. 92 To the extent that this is true, the
result would be at odds with the desired objective of making the
statements available to defendants whenever possible without undue
interference with governmental interests.
The more desirable alternative would be to allow compulsory
production in all cases unless the prosecution establishes that some
legitimate interests would be unduly hampered by disclosure prior to
trial, even if the statement were to be carefully edited prior to pro-
duction.03 This rule would afford due recognition to the defendant's
interest in impeachment of government witnesses, while protecting in
some degree the interests which the government may have in sup-
pression of statements. The burden would be placed on the govern-
ment to establish its position, rather than leaving it to the sole dis-
cretion of the prosecution. The scope of the showing which would be
required would vary with the circumstances of the particular case.
Finally, this rule would have the virtue of avoiding delay in the
majority of cases by the application of a uniform rule in the absence
of special circumstances. 94
The proposed rule might be effectuated by substituting in the
first paragraph of the statute a phrase such as "in any formal proceed-
ing in the case" for the current "in the trial of the case." An addi-
tional sentence could then be added to the effect that: "If the United
States claims that production of any statement ordered to be produced
prior to trial on the merits would unduly hamper effective law en-
92. Louisell, Criminal Discovery, 49 CALIF. L. Rnv. 56, 98 (1961).
93. This proposal should be read in light of note 51 supra.
94. It could be argued that the production of statements at pretrial hearings will
itself lead to delay when the defense requires time to review the statements, but mere
expediency will not justify substantial interference with the interests of the defendant
in fully impeaching the witness. It is revelant only to problems of choice between
alternatives which will protect all interests involved in substantially similar fashion.
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forcement, or would endanger the safety of any person, or would
threaten the national security the court or committing magistrate
may, upon a sufficient showing, rescind the order." If Congress felt
that such a decision were beyond the proper powers of a committing
magistrate, a provision could be drafted whereby application could
be made to a district court judge to pass upon the motion of the
government. Such a provision is not recommended here because it
would lead to delays in preliminary hearings. A fuller examination of
the qualifications and proper powers of the magistrate might reveal
the need for such a rule. If it were determined that the committing
magistrate should be allowed to pass on these issues, the phrase "or
committing magistrate" could be inserted after the word "court"
throughout the statute95 in the interest of clarity. For similar reasons,
the phrase "or formal proceedings" could be added after the word
"trial" wherever appropriate. Otherwise, the statute could stand as
written. 0
CONCLUSION
The Jencks Act in its present form has had and apparently will
continue to have the seemingly unintended effect of uniformly deny-
ing defense access to statements of government witnesses who testify
at pretrial hearings. At least in the context of preliminary hearings
and suppression hearings, there is little justification for this rule while
there are a variety of factors which would indicate that a more liberal
approach is desirable. While case-by-case adjudication might provide
a forum for the development of new procedures, trends in the judicial
interpretation of the Act indicate that the potential for meaningful
judicial reform is limited at best. Therefore, it is suggested that
Congress should reconsider the Act with an eye toward establishing
a standard whereby the defendant would be allowed to examine state-
ments of witnesses who testify at pretrial hearings except where the
prosecution is able to establish that effective law enforcement, public
safety or national security would be threatened by such disclosure.
DAVID B. OLNEY
95. This language would not be inserted in paragraph (d) after the final comma.
The committing magistrate is obviously powerless to declare a mistrial.
96. It is doubtful that the provisions for declaring mistrials would have any
application at the pretrial stage. Therefore, the more typical remedy of strildng the
testimony of the witness would be followed if the government were to persist in re-
fusing to produce statements.
